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Salience, Imagination, and Moral Luck 
(Forthcoming in Philosophical Papers, 2017) 
 The problem of moral luck has been a persistent issue in moral philosophy. Kant 
famously denied its existence, claiming that the will alone determines the moral worth of an 
action.
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 Many, however, are unconvinced by Kant’s treatment and find it intuitively correct to 
think that, at least sometimes, the consequences of an action can change the moral quality of the 
act even if those consequences arise completely as a result of luck. Bernard Williams (1981) 
famously argued for this view, and Thomas Nagel (1979) elaborated on Williams’ treatment of 
it. Nagel defines moral luck as being characterized by cases “where a significant aspect of what 
someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect 
as an object of moral judgment,” (26) and he identifies four distinct kinds of luck which could, 
plausibly, influence our moral judgments regarding a particular act. Of these, luck in the 
outcome of one’s actions will be the primary focus of the discussion here. As an example of this 
sort of luck, Nagel asks us to imagine a truck driver who accidentally hits and kills a child.  
The driver, if he is entirely without fault, will feel terrible about his role in the event, but 
will not have to reproach himself … However, if the driver was guilty of even a minor 
degree of negligence – failing to have his brakes checked recently, for example – then if 
that negligence contributes to the death of the child, he will not merely feel terrible. He 
will blame himself for the death. And what makes this an example of moral luck is that 
he would have to blame himself only slightly for the negligence itself if no situation arose 
which required him to brake suddenly and violently to avoid hitting a child. Yet the 
negligence is the same in both cases, and the driver has no control over whether a child 
will run into his path. 
 
In the end, Nagel admits that moral luck is paradoxical and that a satisfying solution to the 
problem is unlikely to be forthcoming. 
 Absent a solution, then, one promising method of approaching the problem of moral luck 
is to focus on an account of blame which explains why our blaming attitudes vary, appropriately 
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it seems, in cases where the outcome of one’s actions depend a great deal on luck. This is the 
strategy pursued in recent work by T.M. Scanlon (2008) who offers an account of blame which 
construes blame as occurring within the context of particular kinds of relationships that 
individuals have with one another. Thinking of blame as a function of relationships, Scanlon 
suggests, offers a plausible solution to the problem of moral luck. My aim in this paper is to 
show that Scanlon’s account of blame is open to a different kind of luck-based objection. If this 
is correct, then it would undermine much of the motivation for Scanlon’s theory of blame. I then 
attempt to offer a way of understanding moral luck cases which allows for a plausible 
explanation of differential blaming responses by appealing to the salience of certain relevant 
features of the action in question. Before turning to these issues, however, I will begin by 
offering a brief overview of Scanlon’s account of blame 
§1. Scanlon on Blame and Moral Luck 
According to Scanlon, blame occurs when one alters one’s attitudes and dispositions 
toward another person in response to a judgment that the other has impaired his or her 
relationship with one relative to some normative standard. As he puts it,  
[T]o claim that a person is blameworthy for an action is to claim that the action shows 
something about the agent’s attitudes toward others that impairs the relations that others 
can have with him or her. To blame a person is to judge him or her to be blameworthy 
and to take your relationship with him or her to be modified in a way that this judgment 
of impaired relations holds to be appropriate. (Scanlon 2008, 128-9) 
 
So, for Scanlon blame consists in a judgment that a relationship has been impaired and a 
subsequent modification of the attitudes, intentions, and dispositions that comprise that 
relationship. However, making sense of this view requires filling in precisely what it means to 
say that a relationship is impaired as well as what sort of modification Scanlon has in mind.  
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 Impairments of the sort that Scanlon is interested in are to be understood within the 
context of a particular ground relationship. In short, impairment occurs when one party to the 
relationship holds attitudes that are “ruled out by the standards of that relationship, thus making 
it appropriate for the other party to have attitudes other than those that the relationship normally 
involves.” (135) Scanlon’s paradigm example, here, is the case of friendship. Being a friend to 
another person requires that one hold certain attitudes toward one’s friend. These will include 
attitudes of mutual regard, but they will also include attitudes such as concern for the friend’s 
well being, a desire that things go well for the friend, disappointment at the friend’s failures, and 
much more. These attitudes, for Scanlon, constitute the standards of the relationship of 
friendship, and when one party to the relationship is seen not to hold the attitudes that are 
constitutive of the ground relationship the relationship is impaired. In response to this 
impairment, the other party to the relationship may alter her attitudes in a way that is consistent 
with her position relative to the agent being blamed and the significance of the impairment. So, 
when my friend betrays me I have reason to believe that her attitudes are such that the nature of 
our relationship has been changed, and I can modify my attitudes toward my friend in a way that 
is appropriate to our friendship and the significance of the betrayal. For example, I may no 
longer be inclined to confide in the friend who has betrayed my trust, or I may no longer be 
disposed to engage in deep conversations with her which may reveal certain vulnerabilities in 
me. 
 This view of blame has significant appeal when considered within the context of personal 
relationships. However, if the Scanlonian view is to give a full account of the nature of blame, it 
must be able to give an account of instances of blame which occur outside of these relationships 
as well. The reason for this is that if blame is a function of impaired relationships, then it would 
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seem that we cannot blame those with whom we have no relationship. If this is right, then it 
would follow that I cannot actually blame a stranger who wrongs me. In order to address this 
issue, Scanlon suggests that we do, in fact, have a relationship that is impaired by the stranger 
who shows disregard in this way. This he calls the “moral relationship.”  
 The moral relationship, Scanlon suggests, is a relationship that we have with all other 
moral agents. However, unlike friendship, it does not involve a standing set of attitudes that we 
have toward others. Instead, it is something that we have in virtue of being fellow rational beings 
capable of responding to reasons. The requirements of the moral relationship, then, consist in 
those things that we owe to other moral agents (i.e. not to harm them, to give aid when this may 
be easily done, not to lie to them, etc.) as well as a number of other attitudes and dispositions that 
typically characterize good moral relations (such as “being disposed to be pleased when we hear 
of things going well for other people” (Scanlon 2008, 140)). These attitudes characterize the 
moral relationship, according to Scanlon, and when we judge that another person fails to hold 
these attitudes toward us we may modify our attitudes in light of this fact. This judgment and 
modification constitutes moral blame on the Scanlonian view. 
 There is surely more that could be said to fully capture the nuance of the Scanlonian 
picture of blame, but the preceding will be sufficient for the purposes of this paper. The picture 
that he offers is compelling in a number of ways and especially in the weight that it gives to our 
relationships in characterizing blame. However, one of the key virtues of the account, Scanlon 
suggests, is its ability to offer an explanation of our differing responses in cases of moral 
outcome luck, an explanation which hinges on his notion of significance. So, imagine two 
reckless drivers. One driver drives recklessly but makes it to his destination without incident, and 
the other driver is unlucky and hits and kills a child who runs into the street. Each of the drivers 
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has acted recklessly and has demonstrated that he holds attitudes that impair the relationships 
that others can have with him. However, the second driver’s actions are significant for others in a 
way that those of the first driver are not. To this end, Scanlon writes, “he is not only the person 
who killed a child but also the person whose recklessness led to the child’s death. The fact that 
his fault has played this significant role in their [those who are affected by his driving] lives 
raises a greater question about how they are going to understand their relations with him.” (2008, 
149) So, for Scanlon, differential responses in moral luck cases are best understood in light of the 
differential significance the outcomes of actions have for the relationships that agents have with 
one another.  
 There is much to like about Scanlon’s solution to the problem of outcome luck. However, 
given that the ability to offer an explanation of cases of outcome luck is one of the key 
motivating factors for his view (indeed, this ability, or so he suggests, is what gives his view a 
theoretical advantage over reactive attitude based accounts of blame
2
), it is surprising that it has 
not received more attention in philosophical discussions of his account. The ability to explain 
these cases is so important that it functions, Scanlon thinks, as a necessary condition for a theory 
of blame. To this end he writes, “An adequate account of blame should either explain how blame 
can vary in the way that [moral outcome luck] examples suggest or else give a convincing 
explanation of why it should appear to do so even though it does not.” (Scanlon 2008, 126) The 
Scanlonian picture of blame has been subject to criticism on a number of fronts. Some have 
criticized Scanlon’s reliance on the notion of a “moral relationship,” (Sher 2013) others have 
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criticized the view on the grounds that it denies the necessity of the various so-called blaming 
emotions, (Wallace 2011; Wolf 2011) and still others have criticized the view for its perceived 
failure to account for other features of our blaming practices.
3
 However, very little work has 
been done examining his proposed explanation of moral luck cases.
4
 In the following section I 
hope to do just that and to show that Scanlon’s account is vulnerable to a different sort of luck 
challenge, one which I do not believe his theory has the resources to overcome.  
§2. A New Luck-Based Challenge 
 As we have just seen, on Scanlon’s view blame cannot occur absent some ground 
relationship between individuals, and this feature of his account makes it susceptible to a new 
kind of moral luck challenge. The reason is this: there may be cases in which it is a matter of 
luck whether one finds oneself in a particular relationship yet it seems perfectly reasonable to 
blame one independently of whether that relationship obtains. To see this, consider the following 
case: 
The Would-Be Fathers: Sarah has just discovered that she is pregnant. In recent months, 
she has had two regular sexual partners (neither of whom is aware of the other), and 
either one of them could be the father of her baby. She informs each of them separately 
that she is pregnant, and each man, believing himself to be the father, promptly leaves 
town and abandons her, thus shirking his parental obligations. Sarah eventually gives 
birth to a healthy child who grows into an adolescent and, after learning of what these 
men did comes to blame them both deeply for the lack of regard displayed in their 
abandoning him and thereby causing him to miss out on a number of important 
experiences and benefits that come along with having a father present. 
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It seems to me that the child may appropriately blame the two men equally for their actions. 
After all, the attitudes and intentions of each are identical, and they each show the same lack of 
regard for Sarah and her child. Moreover, the significance of each man’s actions for the child is 
identical insofar as either man, had he decided to raise the child, would have been able to support 
and to care for the child. However, the problem for Scanlon’s view is that only one man can 
plausibly be blamed for his action because only one of the men has actually impaired a 
normative relationship with the child, and the fact that it is he, and not the other man, who has 
done so is entirely a matter of luck.  
To make this clearer, imagine a case similar to the case of the Would-Be Fathers in which 
only one man is involved and is known to be the father. That man, let us suppose, decides to 
leave Sarah and their child in just the same way as the two men in the case described above. In 
that case, when the child grows up and learns of what has happened surely his blaming the father 
is appropriate. However, given that the child has never met the man, it may seem as though the 
two actually are not in a relationship at all, and if this is correct, then it would spell trouble for 
Scanlon’s account. In order for the Scanlonian view to explain why blame is appropriate in this 
case, we need first to identify the ground relationship that has been impaired, and there are 
several candidate relationships to which a Scanlonian might appeal. First, perhaps we might 
think that the child’s blame is of a third personal quality. That is, we might think that he blames 
his father as a result of the way in which his father impaired the spousal relationship with his 
mother. This may indeed be true, but we could easily re-imagine the case in a way that avoids 
this possibility. Suppose, for example, that he and his mother are managing well and are not in 
need of any financial or material support, and that he genuinely believes that his mother is better 
off with his father out of the picture. He may nevertheless resent his father deeply for causing 
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him to miss out on a number of experiences or opportunities that go along with having a father 
present. Thus revised, it seems as though the child is blaming his father on his own behalf and 
that it is precisely the lack of a relationship that he is blaming his father for. But, again, this 
interpretation is problematic for Scanlon given that some preexisting relationship is necessary for 
blame. 
Scanlon attempts to address cases that are similar to this. He writes,  
We can be injured by the wrongful action of someone we have never met … in such a 
case, it makes sense to say that we blame that person for bringing about the injury … 
This might be explained by saying that there is a special relationship, in the relevant 
sense, between perpetrators and their victims. In a way this is right, but it cannot be the 
whole story, since that relationship itself cannot be the one that is “impaired” by what the 
perpetrator does. Rather, the victim’s relation to the perpetrator is impaired relative to the 
standard relationship between persons generally… (2008, 147) 
 
So, given these remarks, we might say that in the absence of third personal blame, the child can 
blame his father for violating the standards of the moral relationship. But this doesn’t get things 
quite right either and for two reasons. First, if the action that ostensibly caused the relationship to 
be impaired was that of not being present, or of leaving and failing to offer support, the moral 
relationship cannot ground blame because this does not seem to be something that violates our 
obligations to persons generally. That is, we cannot rightly be said to have an obligation to stay 
by someone’s side or offer them our company and support just in virtue of being fellow rational 
beings. This is an obligation that we have in virtue of being in some special relationship with 
another person. Second, if the impairment to the moral relationship occurs when the child’s 
father knowingly leaves a woman whom he as impregnated, Scanlon’s view still doesn’t offer a 
plausible account of the case. On this interpretation, we might say that, in leaving, the child’s 
father knowingly displays a lack of due regard and therefore impairs the moral relationship that 
he can have with people generally. So, because of this general impairment, when the child grows 
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up he is able to blame his father for violating the moral relationship he is able to have with other 
rational beings. If this true, however, it results in the implausible claim that anyone has as much 
reason to blame the father as the child does.
5
 
 So, if the child is able to blame his father in this case, it must be because the father has 
violated the normative standards of the parent-child relationship.
6
 If this is true, however, then 
the problem posed by the case of the Would-Be Fathers becomes much clearer: only one man 
can be party to the parent-child relationship in this case. Given this, Scanlon’s view is committed 
to the claim that only one of the men can be blamed by the child despite the fact that the 
significance of their actions is the same. However, if this is correct, then either man’s being 
legitimately blamed is entirely a matter of luck insofar as it was beyond his control whether he or 
the other man actually caused the child to be conceived. Insofar as we think that both men are 
equally blameworthy, then, it seems to be the case that appealing to the significance of an agent’s 
actions in the way Scanlon suggests won’t get us out from under the moral luck problem. In 
short, the Scanlonian account of blame cannot give us a full solution to the problem of outcome 
luck simply by appealing to relational impairments for the simple fact that whether a relationship 
obtains at all may itself be the result of outcome luck. 
 There may, however, be a response in the offing on behalf of the Scanlonian. For it might 
be claimed that to suggest that the significance of each man’s action is the same to the child is to 
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simply beg the question.
7
 It might be true, the Scanlonian could respond, that the attitudes and 
dispositions of the two men impair the relationships that they can have with others, but, given 
that only one of the men is actually in this particular relationship his actions have a significance 
that the other man’s actions lack. This significance, then, supports a differential blame response 
from the child.  
In order to see the problem with this response, it will be helpful to look closely at how 
Scanlon characterizes the notion of significance. Doing so will, I think, show that it is not 
altogether clear just what Scanlon means by the term. Earlier on in his work, Scanlon uses the 
concept of significance in the context of his account of an action’s meaning, saying,  
By the meaning of an action for a person, I mean the significance that person has reason 
to assign to it, given the reasons for which it was performed and the person’s relation to 
the agent. The significance of your action, for me, is thus something I can be mistaken 
about … I may be mistaken about this either because I misinterpret your reasons for 
acting as you did or because I have a mistaken idea of what I am entitled to demand of 
you, given our relationship. (2008, 54) 
 
On this technical account of significance, it is easy to see how the response suggested just now 
would be apt. In blaming the man who is not actually his father, the child in our hypothetical 
case would simply be mistaken about what he is entitled to demand. However, it is not clear that 
this technical definition of significance is the one that is at work in Scanlon’s solution to the 
problem of outcome luck. This is because if significance is only a function of the reasons for 
which one acts and the relationship that one has to the person for whom one’s action is 
significant, then it is not at all clear how this notion of significance can solve the moral luck 
problem in the first place.  
To see this, consider the case of the negligent drivers. Both drivers act for the same 
reasons, and both drivers are in the same moral relationship to the parents whose child is killed. 
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If this is all that matters for significance, then appealing to significance gets us nowhere on the 
question of outcome luck. In order to have a solution to the luck problem, then, Scanlon must 
have a broader conception of significance in mind, and this seems to be borne out by what he 
says regarding the case of the negligent drivers. Recall, from the passage I quoted above, that 
Scanlon writes of the unlucky driver, “he is not only the person who killed a child but also the 
person whose recklessness led to the child’s death. The fact that his fault has played this 
significant role in their lives raises a greater question about how they are going to understand 
their relations with him.” (149, emphasis added) Here Scanlon seems not to be using 
“significant” as a term of art but to be using it simply to indicate that the driver’s action played 
an important role in the lives of those affected.
8
 On this reading of “significance,” however, the 
charge that my argument above begs the question does not stick. In the case that I have 
described, the significance (in this general sense) of each man’s actions is the same for the 
simple reason that either man, by acting other than he did or by holding attitudes other than those 
he held, could have provided for the child and prevented the significant negative effects on the 
child’s life of being abandoned. 
§3. Salience and Imagination 
 Given the arguments of the previous section, it seems to me that Scanlon’s solution to the 
problem of outcome luck cannot succeed. Nonetheless, I agree with Scanlon that an adequate 
account of blame should be able to give some explanation as to why blame characteristically 
differs in cases of outcome luck. I disagree, however, that the reactive attitude account cannot 
accomplish this. In this section I will attempt to show that this is the case. My suggestion here is 
that we can explain away the problem of outcome luck entirely by appealing to certain 
psychological features of agents and by demonstrating how these features factor into standard 
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luck cases. This solution to the problem of moral outcome luck can be characterized as an 
instance of what Susan Wolf (2001) calls the rationalist position. “According to this position,” 
she writes, “how much blame one deserves depends on how wrongly one has acted, on how 
much moral fault is revealed or expressed or instantiated in the action one has performed (or in 
one’s failure to act).” (6) In short, I think that this rationalist approach is correct,9 that the quality 
of an agent’s will determines the amount of blame that she is due, and that we need not try to 
give a normative explanation of why unlucky agents deserve more blame but a merely 
descriptive explanation of why they tend to receive more blame as a matter of practice. The 
reactive attitudes conception of blame originates in P.F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” 
and holds that to blame another person is simply to hold one or more of the reactive emotions 
toward her in response to the quality of her will as revealed by her actions. Strawson himself 
focused on the role of resentment, indignation, and, in the first personal case, guilt in our 
blaming responses, and most who take this sort of view give special place to these as well.
10
 
Thus, my feeling of resentment toward the friend who intentionally betrays my trust constitutes a 
form of blame on this view, and this is so regardless of whether I express this resentment to my 
friend, act on it in some other manner, or simply experience a private episode of it. Scanlon 
claims that this sort of view fails to explain our responses in cases of luck, saying, “If the 
reactive attitudes that blame involves are reactions to the attitudes of others as manifested in 
their conduct … then moral outcome luck still seems inexplicable.” (Scanlon 2008, 128) More 
specifically, the suggestion here seems to be that if the reactive attitudes simply track the quality 
of an agent’s will, then no explanation can be given for why blame seems to differ in cases 
where two agents evince the same quality of will but where the outcomes of their actions differ 
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wildly as a result of luck. I think Scanlon is mistaken on this count, and my aim here is to 
provide just such an explanation.  
 The first step in offering an explanation of our differential experience of the reactive 
attitudes in cases of moral luck is to inquire about the circumstances under which emotional 
responses are likely to arise. My suggestion is that we are much more likely to hold the reactive 
attitudes in cases where an agent’s actions make the quality of her will more salient to us. This is 
importantly different from some views which hold that there is an epistemic difference in cases 
of luck such that when bad outcomes happen these allow us to really know the quality of an 
agent’s will in a way that we otherwise would not.11 Rather, my suggestion is that when we 
experience the negative consequences in cases of moral luck, these consequences make the 
quality of the agent’s will especially salient. We may judge, in a detached way, that the agent has 
poor quality of will, but when we are faced with the outcomes of that will its quality becomes 
salient to us in a way that it might not have been had the agent been luckier. We are able to see 
the seriousness of the quality of the agent’s will, and this leads us to have stronger emotional 
responses than we would were that seriousness less visible to us.  
 To see this, consider the case of the two negligent drivers, one of whom hits and kills a 
child as a result of bad luck. When the unlucky driver strikes the child the poor quality of his will 
is highly salient to us because we can see the consequences of it in an extraordinarily vivid way. 
This, of course, is not true in the case of the lucky driver. While we may judge that he has done 
something wrong, the quality of will implicated in his wrongdoing is not nearly as salient to us 
because the terrible consequences it could have wrought are not staring us in the face, as it were. 
However, it may be possible for us to make the actual quality of his will salient through the use 
of imagination. If we are able to imagine the potential consequences of the lucky driver’s actions 
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in a way that is sufficiently vivid, then it is likely that this will affect us in a way that would give 
rise to our experience of one or more reactive emotions. In short, imaginative vividness and 
salience play an important role in our emotional experience, and luck has the ability to make the 
quality of an agent’s will more or less salient. 
 The role that imagination and vividness play in emotional experience can be seen in a 
wide range of situations. Consider, for example, the spouse who, after a particularly vivid dream, 
wakes up feeling angry at his or her partner for a callous remark that was made.
12
 Additionally, it 
is altogether common for one to become angry or resentful all over again when reflecting on a 
past slight, and, I contend, the extent of this anger or resentment is largely a function of how 
vivid the memory of the slight is in one’s mind. These considerations suggest, I think, that 
episodic cognition – the ability to create a mental representation of and to reflect on past or 
future episodes or events – plays an important role in our moral lives.13 Episodic future thinking, 
in particular, helps to make sense of our responses to the lucky driver. One reason that we do not 
blame the lucky driver to any great degree is that we fail, in many cases, to construct sufficiently 
vivid representations of the potential outcomes of his actions, and this prevents the poor quality 
of his will from becoming salient to us.  
 Appealing to salience can help us to make sense of other cases of luck as well. Consider, 
for example, the case of two assassins, one of whom shoots and kills his target while the other 
shoots his target but fails to kill him because the target happens, as a matter of luck, to be 
wearing a bulletproof vest. Intuitively, there is no difference at all in the degree to which we 
blame the two shooters. The reason for this, I think, is that the quality of will is just as salient in 
the case of the lucky shooter as it is in the case of the unlucky one. It requires very little, if any, 
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imagination on our part to see that the assassin whose target survives demonstrated just as much 
ill will as the assassin who succeeded in killing his target. A similar analysis is available in the 
case of the Would-Be Fathers described above. For the child who grows up without a father 
present the quality of each man’s will is highly salient, and he need not engage in any 
imaginative reflection in order to see this. Therefore, he can appropriately blame both men 
regardless of whether they, as a matter of luck, are actually responsible for his conception.  
 Salience and imagination, then, seem clearly to play a role in our ability to perceive and 
evaluate the quality of an agent’s will. However, there is at least one important objection that 
may be advanced at this point: if the salience of an agent’s quality of will is what matters in 
determining the amount of blame that we direct toward him or her, then it seems to be the case 
that we should blame the lucky driver and the unlucky driver to the same degree no matter how 
bad the outcome of the unlucky driver’s actions. So, if the unlucky driver finds himself unable to 
stop at a red light and subsequently hits the broadside of a school bus filled with children, then 
he is to be blamed to the same extent as the lucky driver who goes about his day without 
incident. This is an important problem, but it is one to which there is a readily available response. 
That response is this: in some cases the outcome of an action is so severe and tragic that it raises 
the salience of an agent’s action so much that the quality of the agent’s will is judged far more 
harshly than is appropriate. In short, what is happening in the case of the drivers is likely this: the 
salience created by the outcome of the unlucky driver’s actions causes us to blame him much 
more than his actual quality of will warrants while the outcome of the lucky driver’s actions, 
coupled with our failure to imagine their potential harms in a sufficiently vivid way, causes us to 
blame him much less than the quality of his will warrants. However, the fact that we do have 
differential blaming responses of these kinds in cases of moral luck is well explained by our 
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tendency to respond more strongly to cases in which the moral quality of an agent’s will is most 
salient to us.  
§4. Conclusion 
 I began this paper by outlining the way in which the Scanlonian account of blame aimed 
to solve the problem of moral luck by appealing to the significance of an agent’s actions. I then 
attempted to show that this solution to the problem fails in an important way insofar as there may 
be cases of outcome luck in which one’s being a member of a particular relationship with 
normative standards is itself a matter of luck. Having presented this challenge, I then offered an 
explanation of our differential blaming responses in luck cases that locates the relevant 
difference in the increased or decreased salience that luck imparts on the quality of an agent’s 
will. If I am correct, then the arguments offered here cast doubt on Scanlon’s view of blame 
insofar as one of the primary motivations for his account is its ability to handle cases of moral 
outcome luck. Additionally, the arguments offered here show that a reactive attitudes account of 
blame is able to give a plausible account of moral outcome luck and, therefore, lend credence to 
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